Blowing the whistle by Apesteguía, José et al.
  
Blowing the Whistle 
 
 
 
Jose Apesteguia*, Martin Dufwenberg** & Reinhard Selten*** 
 
 
 
February 2, 2004 
 
 
 
 
Abstract: Leniency clauses, offering cartelists legal immunity if they blow the whistle 
on each other, is a recent anti-trust innovation. The authorities wish to thwart cartels 
and promote competition. This effect is not evident, however; whistle-blowing may 
enforce trust and collusion by providing a tool for cartelists to punish each other. We 
examine the impact of leniency law, and other rules, theoretically and experimentally.  
 
 
Keywords: Anti-trust, leniency, immunity, amnesty, blow the whistle, cartels, price 
competition, Bertrand model, experiment, communication  
 
JEL codes: C92, D43, L13 
 
 
Acknowledgments: We are grateful to Sebastian Goerg for excellent research 
assistance, Uri Gneezy and the participants of several seminars and conferences for 
their comments, and David Reiley and Mike Urbancic for introducing us to 
recombinant estimation. The research has been sponsored by the European Union 
through the TMR research network ENDEAR and through the Swedish Competition 
Authority. Apesteguia and Dufwenberg gratefully acknowledge the hospitality of the 
Laboratory of Experimental Economics at Bonn University. 
 
 
 
* Public University of Navarre; josej.apesteguia@unavarra.es  
** University of Arizona; martind@eller.arizona.edu  
*** University of Bonn 
 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
Governments actively fight cartels. It is illegal for firms to agree to fix prices, or 
even to engage in discussions, the presumption being that pricing conspiracies will 
ensue. In the United States this is regulated in the Sherman Act, dating back to 1890 
(see Hovenkamp 2000, and Scherer & Ross 1990). Many other countries enacted 
similar laws in the 20th century. 
A recent innovation in anti-trust regulation is to guarantee immunity from 
prosecution to cartelists who report to the anti-trust authority a cartel in which they 
are taking part. The US Antitrust Division created such a “Leniency policy” (also 
referred to as “Amnesty Program” or “Corporate Immunity Policy”), first in 1978 and 
then refined and extended in 1993. Many other countries have since adopted similar 
schemes, and collaboration within the OECD Competition Committee continuously 
fosters correlated development of anti-trust legislation throughout the OECD country 
members.1 The European Commission, for example, introduced leniency rules first in 
1996, and subsequently in 2002, when a legislation, which closely mimics the US 
policy, was adopted. A press release announced this as follows (European 
Commission 2002a; emphasis added by us): 
 
The European Commission ... took another important step to uncover and suppress 
price-fixing pacts and other hard-core cartels. The Commission unanimously 
adopted a new leniency policy that creates greater incentives for companies to 
blow the whistle on the most serious violations of antitrust rules. Under the new 
rules the Commission will grant total immunity from fines to the first company to 
submit evidence on a cartel unknown to, or unproved by the Commission.  
 
The press release quotes Competition Commissioner Mario Monti as follows, 
reflecting some objectives and conjectures of the legislator (our emphasis): 
                                                 
1See OECD Competition Committee (2002), a collection of reports that articulates anti-trust goals and 
which gives details about the leniency programs in the US, the UK, Canada, and the EU. 
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[T]he new policy will increase the likelihood that cartels will be detected which, 
together with the Commission's determination to impose fines at dissuasive levels, 
should deter companies from entering into collusive behaviour in the first place. 
 
The new legislation is furthermore motivated with reference to “the experience 
of the United States”, which is taken to be a success. This positive judgement is 
shared by the US Department of Justice, as reflected in the report by Gary Spratling 
(1996, p. 2), Deputy Assistant Attorney General of the US Antitrust Division: 
 
The early identification of antitrust offences through compliance programs, 
together with the opportunity to pay zero dollars in fines under the Division´s 
Corporate Amnesty program, has resulted in a “race to the courthouse,”... 
 
A legally sanctioned opportunity for costless whistle-blowing changes the nature 
of the game played in the marketplace. However, it is not obvious that the effect will 
be to thwart cartels. Consider the following argument: Cartel agreements are illegal, 
and must therefore rely on trust rather than written contracts. A colluding firm must 
therefore reckon that a fellow cartelist may cheat on a price fixing agreement. In this 
connection, whistle-blowing may be a useful tool. If a firm deviates from a cartel 
agreement, a fellow cartelist may retaliate by reporting the deviator to the anti-trust 
authority. Therefore, deviations from cartel agreements may be discouraged, and the 
propensity to join cartels therefore enhanced, so that collusion may be fostered! 
It is not easy to judge these matters by mere observation of market data. There is 
the informational problem that undetected cartels cannot be observed, and the 
counterfactual problem that one cannot know how a market would have operated with 
some other anti-trust policy. Against this background we attempt to shed light on the 
impact of leniency policy, and various alternative anti-trust policies (which have 
either been used historically or which may have interesting properties), in two ways. 
First, we propose a few highly stylized market games which pinpoint and isolate the 
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key feature of some anti-trust policy. We derive predictions, which are contrasted to 
the views of the world held by competition authorities. Second, we examine our 
market games experimentally. We test whether the theoretical predictions stand up, 
and whether the effects envisioned by anti-trust authorities obtain.  
When evaluating experiments in industrial organization one should critically 
examine the parallel between the laboratory and naturally occurring markets. To what 
extent can the behavior of students in a lab reveal something about the conduct of 
firms in the marketplace? Arguably, this parallel is strengthened by our focus on 
communication, in cartels that must rely on trust to enforce agreements. The 
communication occurs between persons, in the lab and in other markets alike. 
 Theory, experimental material (procedures, hypotheses, results), connections 
to related literature, and conclusions appear in sections 2, 3, 4, and 5, respectively. 
 
2. THEORY 
The nature and complexity of naturally occurring markets varies. Which 
particular characteristics should be addressed in an experiment? We believe ours is 
the first laboratory study of leniency policy, so it seems natural to focus on a simple 
context derived from a well understood basic model. We explicitly incorporate 
opportunities for cartel communication, but otherwise build on a version of the classic 
one-shot Bertrand model of price competition, leaving otherwise aside many 
‘realistic’ extensions of that model involving for example heterogeneous goods, 
incomplete information, or repeated interaction.2 Our goal is to provide benchmark 
results which may serve as a backdrop to and reference point for future research that 
examines enriched contexts and extends, generalizes, and tests the robustness of our 
                                                 
2 For textbook discussions of Bertrand models, see Tirole (1994, pp. 209-18) and Vives (1999, ch. 5). 
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findings. In the conclusions we suggest a number of extensions of the model that may 
be subject of future theoretical and experimental research. 
Textbook versions of the Bertrand model often admit infinitely many 
strategies, but we consider a discretized version similar to that introduced by 
Dufwenberg & Gneezy (2000). The theoretical analysis, and the subsequent 
experimental design, evolves around augmented versions of the following game: 
 
• There are three firms. 
• Each firm simultaneously chooses a price in the set {91, 92, …, 100}. 
• The firms choosing the lowest price divide among themselves a profit equal to 
the difference between this price and 90. The other firms earn nothing. 
 
This market game captures the following assumptions: Consumer demand is 
completely inelastic for prices up to the consumers’ maximum willingness to pay, 
which equals 100. The quantity demanded is (normalized to) one (divisible) unit. The 
per unit production cost is 90. (The particular 90/100-parameterization is chosen on 
the grounds that it accords well with the rule for "fines", to be described below under 
the heading "STANDARD ".)  
The game possesses a unique Nash equilibrium. In this equilibrium each firm 
chooses a price of 91. The profit to each firm is (91-90)/3=1/3. 
We next discuss four modifications of this model, which capture particular 
anti-trust legislations. Each modification corresponds to one experimental treatment. 
We shall refer to these four models, as well as to the corresponding experimental 
treatments, as STANDARD, LENIENCY, BONUS, and  IDEAL. All but the last of these 
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have a non-trivial dynamic structure, and it is natural to apply the solution concept of 
subgame perfect equilibrium. 
 
STANDARD 
The idea that discussions among firms fosters collusion goes back at least to 
Adam Smith. In Book I of The Wealth of Nations, he writes: 
 
People of the same trade seldom meet together, even for merriment and diversion, 
but the conversation ends in a conspiracy against the public, or in some 
contrivance to raise prices.  
 
Modern anti-trust legislation takes a similar outlook. Documented meetings 
between competitors is taken as (full or partial) evidence of a cartel. Because of 
problems regarding observability, provability, or measurability, it is to a large extent 
the occurrence of a meeting itself rather than the content of what was said or the 
nature of the agreement struck or the resulting inefficiency in the marketplace that is 
the basis of legal action. See Hovenkamp (2000) for a discussion. 
One may imagine that an authority learns about cartels through own 
investigation, through third party reports, or through the cartel members themselves. 
We shall disregard the former two possibilities, and focus exclusively on the last 
possibility (in all models we derive). Again, this abstracts away from some ‘realistic’ 
features of natural markets, but we leave it for future research to examine whether our 
results are sensitive to this omission. 
The market game STANDARD is an attempt to capture the essence of the law 
prior to the introduction of leniency clauses. There are three stages. In stage one, each 
firm chooses whether or not it wishes to join a cartel. A cartel, involving non-binding 
communication between the involved parties, is arranged if and only if all firms wish 
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to have a cartel. In stage two, each player chooses a price in the set {91, 92, …, 100}. 
Stage three occurs if and only if a cartel was formed in stage one. In stage three, each 
firm considers whether or not to report the cartel. 
The firms’ payoffs depend on their price choices just as in the previously 
discussed model of Bertrand price competition, except that the payoffs may be 
modified by fines. Fines have to be paid if and only if a cartel was formed and some 
firm reported the cartel. In this case, each firm must pay a fine equal to ten percent of 
its revenue.3 This ten percent rule is directly adopted from the current legislation of 
the European Union (see European Commission 2002b). 
In order to enhance the feel for the payoff structure, it may be helpful at this 
point to consider an example. We exhibit a particular path of play, chosen merely on 
the basis that it displays key features of the payoff function. We will reconsider this 
path each time we introduce a new model. 
 
Example 1: In stage 1 each firm expresses its wish to join a cartel. In stage 2, 
firms 1 and 2 choose a price of 97 while firm 3 chooses 99. In stage 3, firms 2 and 3 
report the cartel. The payoffs of firms 1 and 2 will be  (97 - 90)/2 – 0.10 × 97/2 = –
1.35. The payoff of firm 3 will be  0 – 0.10 × 0 = 0. Note that the path of play 
described is not the result of an equilibrium strategy profile (e.g., either player can 
gain by not agreeing to join a cartel, and then choosing 91). 
 
The payoff function in STANDARD has the following properties: Collusion in a 
cartel is beneficial to the firms only if (i) it helps them achieve higher prices, and (ii) 
their cartel is not subsequently detected. The firms never profit from being in a 
detected cartel; the ten percent rule, coupled with the underlying assumptions about 
production costs and demand (the 90/100-parameterization described in the beginning 
of section 2), ensure that profits never exceed fines. It is better to abstain from joining 
                                                 
3 The revenue of a firm choosing the lowest price equals that price, divided by the number of firms 
choosing that price. For any other firm, the revenue is zero. 
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a cartel than to be caught in one. The underlying assumption is that the legislation is 
not so lax that it is trivially in a firm's interest to join a cartel. We felt that these 
properties were reasonable to include in the experiment, and consequently some key 
parameters of the design (the ten percent rule and the 90/100-parameterization for 
prices) were chosen so as to achieve this. 
STANDARD has multiple (subgame perfect) equilibria. We focus on describing 
the key features of the patterns of play admitted. Most importantly, any symmetric 
price vector is sustainable in equilibrium. There are equilibria where no cartel forms 
(because they would be reported), and each firm chooses a price of 91. Other 
equilibria involve successful collusion. The following example describes an 
equilibrium resulting in collusion at the highest possible price (equilibria involving 
cartel formation and symmetric pricing at lower levels can be described analogously). 
 
Example 2 (collusive equilibrium): In stage one each firm indicates that it 
wishes to have a meeting with the other two firms. Thereafter, each firm chooses a 
price of 100 and does not report unless some other firm chooses a price below 100. If 
(outside the equilibrium path) some firm decides against having a meeting, then each 
firm chooses a price of 91. 
 
The path of play described by this equilibrium entails cartel formation, pricing 
at the highest possible level, and no cartel reporting. Note that if a firm were to 
deviate, undercutting the others with a price of 99, its payoff (given that the others 
stay with their equilibrium strategies) would be -.9, which is strictly less than 10/3, 
the payoff from sticking to the equilibrium strategy. 
Our theoretical conclusion: STANDARD may sustain collusion with high prices. 
 
LENIENCY 
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The market game LENIENCY works just like STANDARD, except in terms of how 
fines are determined after a cartel is formed. If one firm reports the cartel, then this 
firm pays no fine, while each of the other two firms pays ten percent of its revenue. If 
two firms report the cartel, then each of these firms pay a fine of five percent of its 
revenue, while the third firm pays ten percent of its revenue. If all three firms reports 
the cartel, then each firm pays a fine of 6.67 percent of its revenue. 
Relative to STANDARD, LENIENCY offers a fine reduction to a reporting firm; 
the fine is eliminated, cut in half, or reduced by one third, depending on the number 
(one, two, or three) of whistle-blowers. These rules roughly follow the practice of 
partial immunity clauses applied by the antitrust authorities if more than one cartelist 
blows the whistle at about the same time. 
 
Example 3: In stage 1 each firm expresses its wish to join a cartel. In stage 2, 
firms 1 and 2 choose a price of 97 while firm 3 chooses 99. In stage 3, firms 2 and 3 
report the cartel. The payoff of firm 1 will be  (97 - 90)/2 – 0.10 × 97/2 = –1.35. The 
payoff of firm 2 will be  (97 - 90)/2 – 0.05 × 97/2 = 1.075. The payoff of firm 3 will 
be  0 – 0.05 × 0 = 0. The path of play described is not the result of an equilibrium 
strategy profile (e.g., either player can gain by not agreeing to join a cartel, and then 
choosing 91). 
 
LENIENCY strengthens the incentives for whistle-blowing. One may expect, 
therefore, that collusion is avoided at equilibrium. However, the structure of the set of 
(subgame perfect) equilibria remains essentially unchanged relative to STANDARD. 
Again, any symmetric price vector is admitted as part of an equilibrium. As an 
illustration, the strategy profile described in Example 2 forms a collusive equilibrium 
in LENIENCY exactly as in STANDARD. 
The claim that LENIENCY may sustain cartels and high prices is somewhat less 
convincing than the analogous claim for STANDARD, however. In LENIENCY, any 
equilibrium involving the formation of a cartel will entail the use of weakly 
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dominated strategies. In LENIENCY, unlike in STANDARD, a cartelist can never be 
made worse off by blowing the whistle and may be better off. 
Our theoretical conclusion: LENIENCY may sustain collusion with high prices, 
but the case for this to happen is weaker in LENIENCY than in STANDARD. 
  
BONUS 
Given our theoretical finding that LENIENCY is not unambiguously successful 
in avoiding cartels and inducing competitive behavior, it is natural to think of 
alternative schemes which theory would suggest achieve that end. We consider a 
scheme which is identical to LENIENCY in terms of how fines are determined, but 
which adds the rule that all the whistle-blowers get to share among themselves all the 
fines paid by the non-reporting cartelists. That is: A lone whistle-blower pays no fine 
and collects the fines paid by the other two as a bonus. With two whistle-blowers, 
each of them pays a fine of 5% of its revenue and collects half the fine of the third 
firm as a bonus. When all three firms blow the whistle each of them pays a fine of 
6.67% of its revenue, and no bonuses are collected. 
 
Example 4: In stage 1 each firm expresses its wish to join a cartel. In stage 2, 
firms 1 and 2 choose a price of 97 while firm 3 chooses 99. In stage 3, firms 2 and 3 
report the cartel. The payoff of firm 1 will be  (97 - 90)/2 – 0.10 × 97/2 = –1.35. The 
payoff of firm 2 will be  (97 - 90)/2 – 0.05 × 97/2 + (0.10 × 97/2)/2 = 3.50. The payoff 
of firm 3 will be  0 – 0.05 × 0 + (0.10 × 97/2)/2 = 2.425. The path of play described is 
not the result of an equilibrium strategy profile (e.g., player 1 can gain by not agreeing 
to join a cartel). 
 
BONUS strengthens the incentives for whistle-blowing further, and the 
structure of the set of (subgame perfect) equilibria changes dramatically. In fact, in 
equilibrium no cartel is formed, and each firm chooses a price of 91, the most 
competitive price. 
 9
To see that collusion is ruled out, consider the subgame after each cartelist has 
indicated that it wishes to enter a cartel. First, note that following any symmetric price 
choice vector, to blow the whistle it is a strictly dominant choice for each firm, and 
the consequence would be negative profits to all firms. Second, following any other 
asymmetric price choice vector, if there is a low price seller who does not blow the 
whistle then it is a best reply for a high price seller to blow the whistle. Given this, it 
is a best reply for the low price sellers to report. Thus no bonuses are collected, and 
hence high price sellers get zero profits. Finally, note that not joining the cartel in the 
first place, and pricing at the minimum level assures strictly positive payoff.  
Our theoretical conclusion: BONUS preclude cartels, and induces competitive 
pricing. 
 
IDEAL 
All the preceding models take seriously the idea that firms may meet and 
discuss prices. That option would seem relevant, as a de facto opportunity, in most 
naturally occurring markets. However, a casual glance at texts produced by 
competition authorities suggests that they would like to block this option. As a yard-
stick for measuring the "success" of anti-trust policy, it is then natural to consider 
what would happen if cartel meetings were outright impossible. These are the 
conditions in IDEAL. 
The resulting model is identical to the benchmark Bertrand game, discussed in 
the beginning of this section. In the name of presentational completeness, we again 
illustrate despite the simplicity of the game: 
 
Example 5: Firms 1 and 2 choose a price of 97 while firm 3 chooses 99. The 
payoff of firms 1 and 2 will be  (97 - 90)/2 = 3.50. The payoff of firm 3 will be 0. The 
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path of play described is not the result of an equilibrium strategy profile (e.g., either 
player can gain by choosing 96). 
 
There is only one stage where firms choose prices. In the unique equilibrium 
of the game, each firm chooses a price of 91. The profit to each firm is (91-90)/3=1/3. 
Our theoretical conclusion: IDEAL induces competitive pricing. 
 
Overview 
Table 1 gives an overview of our four market games, highlighting some key 
features: 
 
Table 1: The four market games 
 
Game Key Features Equilibria 
STANDARD Three stages; no fine reductions; no bonuses All symmetric price vectors 
LENIENCY Three stages; leniency; no bonuses All symmetric price vectors 
BONUS Three stages; leniency; bonuses (91,91,91) 
IDEAL One stage; no possibility of cartels (91,91,91) 
 
 
 
3. THE EXPERIMENT 
3.1 Procedures 
The experiments were run at the Laboratory for Experimental Economics at 
the University of Bonn in July 2002. The computerized program was developed using 
RatImage (Abbink & Sadrieh 1995). We had 12 groups of 3 participants in each of the 
four treatments, except in LENIENCY where we had 16 groups of three participants. 
Hence, a total of 156 participants took part in the experiment. 
Earnings, derived from the payoff numbers in the previous section, were 
recorded in Taler (the experimental currency). Talers were convertible to Euros at the 
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rate of 2 Euros per Taler.4 Average earnings in the experiment were €11, and the 
maximum and minimum payment made were €56 and €1 respectively. The treatments 
differed in terms of the number of stages involved in the games played, and the 
complexity of the associated instructions. Therefore sessions varied in length from 20 
minutes in the case of IDEAL (where the game has one stage and the instructions were 
simple) to one hour in BONUS (where the game has three stages and the instructions 
were more complicated). 
When participants arrived at the laboratory they were seated in a lecture room 
where the instructions (see Appendix A) were introduced and questions answered. 
The participants were then randomly assigned to visually isolated cubicles equipped 
with computer terminals. There they had to answer a detailed questionnaire (see 
Appendix B) on the rules of the game they were about to participate in. The 
experiment did not proceed until all participants had correctly answered all questions.  
Then play started. Except for IDEAL (where participants directly entered the 
price competition stage), the first decision stage in all treatments was the 
communication stage. In the communication stage participants had to simultaneously 
decide whether they would like to have a meeting with the other two members of the 
group. The instruction made it clear that there would be a meeting if and only if all 
three members decided that they would like to have a meeting, and that having a 
meeting meant joining a cartel. They were also informed that a meeting would be 
organized as a computerized chat that would last for 10 minutes. 
After all players decided whether they would like to have a meeting, they were 
informed whether a meeting would take place. In that case the chat was started. The 
only restriction imposed on communication was that it was forbidden for participants 
                                                 
4 At the time the experiments were run €1 approximately corresponded to $1. 
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to reveal their identity in any way. This rule was broken by one group (group 11 in 
LENIENCY). As a consequence, we exclude this group from the analysis of price 
choices and cartel reports. 
After the chat was completed, the price competition stage begun. Each 
participant simultaneously chose a price, which was an integer in the range of 91 to 
100. Once all players had made this choice, each one got information on the prices 
chosen by the two other players in the group, and on their own profit. All of this was 
explained to the participants in the instructions. 
After the price competition stage, the experiment was over for participants in 
IDEAL, as well as those groups in the other treatments that did not have a meeting. The 
other groups (in STANDARD, LENIENCY, and BONUS) that had a meeting, entered their 
third (and final) decision stage: the cartel report stage. Participants in the cartel report 
stage, knowing the price choices of the two other firms, simultaneously decided 
whether they wanted to report their cartel to the authorities. 
After all participants made their choice they got feedback on how many 
members of their group reported their cartel, and their own total earnings in the 
experiment. The total number of Talers earned by a participant consisted of the 
market profit, minus fines plus bonuses, where relevant, plus four Talers, if the sum of 
all this was positive, and was zero Talers otherwise. This rule was introduced in order 
that the subjects did not leave the lab with negative payments.5 In addition there was a 
show-up fee of €1, so that subjects in fact were guaranteed positive earnings. All of 
this was explained to the participants in the instructions. 
Finally participants were privately paid in cash, and the experiment ended. 
                                                 
5 Although we could have avoided this rule by using a larger portion of our research budget for the 
show-up fees, we judged that it was better to let the bulk of that money be used to create salient payoffs 
in the game itself. The structure of the equilibrium set remains unchanged. 
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 3.2 Results 
We organize this section mainly by responding to the following questions: 
 
• Is there a problem with STANDARD? 
• Does LENIENCY improve on STANDARD? 
• Is BONUS even better? 
 
The suggestive use of the terms “problem”, “improve”, and “better” in these 
questions should not be taken as indicative of our judgments. Rather, the terms are 
meant to reflect the viewpoint of some anti-trust authority, which wishes to prevent 
cartel formation and induce competitive pricing. 
We will formulate answers on the basis of the market prices,6 the number of 
cartels formed, and the proportion of cartels detected. Finally, we close this section by 
responding to a fourth question: 
 
• Are there other notable results? 
 
Here we report findings that do not accord naturally with the preceding 
questions. 
 
Is there a problem with STANDARD? 
To answer this question we compare STANDARD with IDEAL, the market game 
where cartels cannot be formed. The implicit assumption is that since IDEAL embodies 
the market conditions that the competition authority would hope to have, the outcome 
                                                 
6 The market price is the lowest price chosen in the triopoly market. 
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under IDEAL provides a natural measuring rod concerning the authority’s success in 
fighting cartels and boosting competitive pricing.  
Table 2 gives the average market prices in the two treatments. 
 
Table 2: Average market prices 
 
 STANDARD IDEAL 
Average 
Market Price 
 
96.58 
 
92.25 
 
 
The average market price in STANDARD is higher than in IDEAL. A permutation test on 
the basis of the market price for the individual groups shows that this result is 
significant (p = .00081; one-sided). We conclude that, according to the IDEAL 
yardstick of success that we attribute to the authority, there is indeed a problem with 
STANDARD. Markets where cartels can be formed and no fine reduction is issued for 
whistle-blowing, yield significantly higher prices than markets where cartels cannot 
be formed. 
The question arises whether LENIENCY does any better. 
 
Does LENIENCY improve on STANDARD? 
Table 3 presents all the most important data in our experiment. (A more 
complete presentation of the disaggregated data appears in Appendix C.)  The table 
reports the average market price in each treatment, the market prices in each group, 
and it indicates which groups that engaged in a cartel (shaded background), and which 
cartels were reported to the authorities (indicated by * markings). 
 
 
 
 15
Table 3: Market prices, cartels, and reports 
 
 STANDARD  LENIENCY  BONUS  IDEAL 
Group 1 100   96*  93  92 
Group 2 100  91   92*  92 
Group 3 92   95*  100  94 
Group 4 93   100*   96*  91 
Group 5 91   91*  91  91 
Group 6  98*  91   96*  93 
Group 7  99*  91  93  93 
Group 8 91  92   100*  91 
Group 9  98*  91  100  94 
Group 10 100  100   100*  92 
Group 11 100  –   95*  93 
Group 12  97*  93   92*  91 
Group 13   91     
Group 14   92     
Group 15   100     
Group 16    92*     
        
Average Market Price 96.58  93.73  95.67  92.25 
% of Cartels 67%  50%  75%  – 
% of Cartels Reported 50%  71.4%  77.8%  – 
 
Note: A shaded cell indicates that a cartel was formed in the corresponding group. The 
symbol * indicates that in that group at least one firm reported the cartel. Group 11 in 
LENIENCY is excluded from the analysis of prices and reports because of a violation of the 
experimental procedures during the chat. 
 
Table 3 shows that LENIENCY gives the second lowest average market price. 
LENIENCY provides significantly lower market prices than STANDARD (p = .0312; one-
sided permutation test), and there is no significant difference between IDEAL and 
LENIENCY (p = .10348; one-sided permutation test). We conclude that LENIENCY 
reduces market prices relative to STANDARD, approaching the level marked by IDEAL. 
Hence, the possibility of fine reduction for whistle-blowing has a clear impact on 
market prices in the intended direction. 
So far we have only reported results on pricing, but the competition authority 
is also interested in the patterns of cartel formation in the market. The authority wants 
to deter cartels from forming, and to encourage reporting of those cartels which form. 
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LENIENCY does no worse than STANDARD in these respects. In STANDARD 67% of the 
groups formed a cartel; in LENIENCY the percentage is 50%. However, this difference 
is not statistically significant (p = .2094; Fisher exact test, one-sided). 
This finding can be further supported by exploring a new statistical technique, 
known as recombinant estimation, developed by Mullin & Reiley (2004). Note that 
there is no interaction between players prior to their decision whether or not they wish 
to communicate, and that the actual number of cartels formed is influenced by the 
realization of the random pairing of participants in the lab. A recombinant estimation 
computes how many cartels would arise for all possible alternative realizations that 
could have occurred, and uses this information to compute more efficient estimates of 
mean cartel formation rates than one would get from the usual mean. In our case the 
approach is equivalent to having about a 40% improvement over the original number 
of independent observations. Table 4 reports the recombinant mean percentage of 
cartels, and the standard error of the mean, separated by treatment. 
 
Table 4: Recombinant Estimation of Cartel Formation 
 
 STANDARD LENIENCY  BONUS 
Recombinant Mean 63% 46%  69% 
Standard Error of the Mean 12%  11%  11% 
 
Comparing Table 4 with the data reported in Table 3 it is immediate that the 
picture does not change dramatically, indicating a high degree of consistency in our 
results. We get slightly smaller percentages of cartel formation, the reason being that 
in the three treatments there was an instance of a group in which two players did not 
wish to communicate (Group 4 in STANDARD, Group 9 in LENIENCY, and Group 5 in 
BONUS; see Table 5 in Appendix C). Then, when subjected to recombination, these 
same players cause more cartel formation failures. Contrasting the percentage of 
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cartel formation between STANDARD and LENIENCY we still get that the difference is 
non-significant (p = .1283; Fisher exact test, one-sided).7
 Turning to cartel reporting, since decisions are made after communication and 
interaction through price decisions, individual decisions are not independent anymore 
and recombinant estimation is therefore no longer appropriate. Hence, we return to 
Table 3. We see that 50% of the cartels that took place in STANDARD were reported, 
while in LENIENCY the percentage increases to 71.4%. A permutation test on the 
number of individual reports per group gives a significance of .092 (one-sided). 
 All in all, the question ‘Does LENIENCY improve on STANDARD?’ gets an 
affirmative answer. LENIENCY provides significantly lower market prices, and there is 
some tendency towards fewer cartels and more cartel reports. 
We next evaluate whether BONUS, the market game where the incentives to 
report the cartel are the strongest, fares even better. 
 
Is BONUS even better? 
Table 3 shows that BONUS provides the second highest market price. In fact, 
there is not a significant difference between BONUS and STANDARD (p = .2872; one-
sided permutation test). On the other hand, IDEAL and LENIENCY exhibit lower prices 
than BONUS (respectively, p = .0027 and p = .0920; one-sided permutation tests). In 
light of our theoretical analysis one may have been led to expect BONUS to outperform 
LENIENCY, so against this background our results on BONUS are remarkable. 
BONUS gives the highest percentage of cartels formed (75% as opposed to 67% 
in STANDARD and 50% in LENIENCY), but the differences are not significant. 
Hypothesis testing on the recombinant data reported in Table 4 shows that there is no 
                                                 
7 A t-test on the recombinant data leads to the same conclusion (p = .1401; t-test, one-sided).   
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significant difference between BONUS and STANDARD, but LENIENCY gives a lower 
percentage of cartel formation at the .10 significance level (p = .0891; Fisher exact 
test, one-sided).8 Finally, BONUS shows the highest percentage of cartels reported 
(77.8% as opposed to 50% in STANDARD and 71.4% in LENIENCY). However, these 
differences are not statistically significant. 
In retrospect, we conjecture that the possibility of entering into a cartel in 
BONUS with an agreement on high prices is attractive to many players. The possibility 
of first colluding in prices, then reporting the fellow cartelists and collecting as a 
bonus all the fines paid by the others is perhaps very tempting. Of course, this would 
require that such players are not dissuaded by the possibility that other players are as 
cunning as they are themselves. Players would have to be rather optimistic on the 
odds of out-smarting the others. 
 
Are there other notable results? 
In every single instance when a cartel formed and there was no subsequent 
report, each cartelist chose a price of 100. There is no cartel in the entire experiment 
with a market price below 100 that was not reported. An examination of the data 
shows that in all games where at least one player priced below 100 there is some other 
firm with a price above the market price that reports the cartel. This pattern of play 
may be suggestive of punishment, and is in line with the equilibrium strategy reported 
in Example 2 of section 2. Moreover, in all groups of LENIENCY and BONUS that 
formed a cartel with a subsequent price below 100, the player who chose the market 
price also reported the existence of the cartel.
                                                 
8 Again, the above is consistent with a t-test analysis: p = .2793 and p = .063 for STANDARD versus 
BONUS and LENIENCY versus BONUS, respectively (t-tests, one-sided). 
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 In STANDARD, with no monetary incentive to report the existence of the cartel, 
none of the 4 games with a market price of 100 was reported. In LENIENCY and 
BONUS, 1 out of 3, and 2 out of 4 respectively were reported. These are so few 
observations, however, that it not possible to draw very far-reaching conclusions. 
Do cartels lead to higher market prices? Our data clearly shows that this is the 
case. In those treatments where it was possible to enter into a cartel (STANDARD, 
LENIENCY and BONUS), the average market price in the groups that formed a cartel is 
97.4, while the average market price in those groups that did not enter into a cartel is 
91.7 which is close to the competitive equilibrium level of 91. The permutation test 
yields significance at any level. 
 
4. RELATED LITERATURE 
There are many experimental studies of price competition, starting with 
Fouraker & Siegel (1963). See Plott (1989) and Holt (1995) for reviews.9 Holt's 
section VIII.D reviews what (relatively little) is known about the impact of 
communication on collusion; Friedman (1967), Isaac, Ramey & Williams (1984), 
Holt & Davis (1990), and Brown-Kruse, Cronshaw & Shenk (1990) concern price 
competition and communication. These studies do not deal with leniency clauses in 
anti-trust (and the set-up typically differs from ours in other ways, like having 
repeated interaction), but provide some evidence that communication fosters 
                                                 
9 More recent studies include Brown-Kruse, Rassenti, Reynolds & Smith (1994), Cason (1995), Cason 
& Davis (1995), Cason & Friedman (1997, 2003), Mason & Phillips (1997), Dufwenberg & Gneezy 
(2000), Huck, Normann & Oechssler (2000), Morgan, Orzen & Sefton (2004), Abbink & Brandts 
(2002), Bornstein & Gneezy (2002), Dufwenberg, Gneezy, Goeree & Nagel (2002), and Selten & 
Apesteguia (2002). 
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collusion, a conclusion which accords well with our finding that prices are lowest in 
IDEAL.10  
Despite of its empirical relevance, few experimental studies actually consider 
anti-trust legislation in any form. Hong & Plott (1982) investigate the influence of a 
rate filling policy to shippers on US inland water routes, while Grether & Plott (1984) 
examine different pricing practices motivated by a specific litigation of the US 
Federal Trade Commission. These studies show that the success of anti-trust 
regulations may depend on surprising behavioral regularities, which highlights the 
importance of laboratory studies on understanding anti-trust. 
Finally, there are theoretical papers by Motta & Polo (2002), Spagnolo (2000a, 
2000b), and Hinloepen (2002) that examine the impact of leniency clauses in anti-
trust legislation. See Rey (2001) for a general discussion of the theory of competition 
policy, of which these studies are part.11 The games dealt with are neither more nor 
less special than ours (there are many differences concerning the nature of fines, 
whether there is repetition, et cetera), and the theories proposed illustrate that whether 
leniency fosters or hinders collusion may depend on a variety of issues in subtle 
ways.12 For future research, it may be of interest to test these theories experimentally, 
and to investigate whether our findings extend to those settings.  
 
 
                                                 
10 Some work (in psychology as well as in economics) examines how communication affects strategic 
interaction, experimentally and theoretically, in other types of (coordination, bargaining, or trust) 
games. See Charness & Dufwenberg (2003, footnote 4) for references. 
11 See also McCutcheon’s (1997) theoretical evaluation of the Sherman act. That paper is not about 
leniency clauses, but it is related to ours in that central ideas concern the impact of communication on 
collusion. 
12 For example, Spagnolo (2000b) examines the impact of imposing a fixed fine on firms caught 
colluding. The unique subgame perfect equilibrium of his model without leniency clauses entails 
marginal cost pricing, in contrast to our analysis of STANDARD where fines depend on revenue (the EU 
10% rule) and where every symmetric price distribution is a subgame perfect equilibrium. 
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5. SUMMING UP 
The aim of this paper is to examine how leniency programs in anti-trust 
influence pricing as well as the formation and detection of cartels. The idea on which 
leniency legislation is based is crisply summarized by the following quotation from 
the OECD Competition Committee (2002) report (emphasis in original): 
 
The challenge in attacking hard-core cartels is to penetrate their cloak of secrecy. 
To encourage a member of a cartel to confess and implicate its co-conspirators 
with first-hand, direct "insider" evidence about their clandestine meetings and 
communications, an enforcement agency may promise a smaller fine, shorter 
sentence, less restrictive order, or complete amnesty.  
 
To learn about the impact of leniency policy based on observation of market data 
is hard, because undetected cartels cannot be observed and because one cannot 
observe how a market would have operated with some other anti-trust policy. The 
experimental laboratory may then be useful as a "wind tunnel" for revealing insights 
about naturally occurring markets (for early examples see Plott 1987). The wind 
tunnel analogy (to laboratory tests of prototypes for aircraft) was mentioned to by the 
Nobel committee, which awarded the 2002 economics prize to Vernon Smith partly 
for his contributions to the associated research strategy (see Royal Swedish Academy 
of Sciences, 2002, section 1.3). 
We investigate the impact of leniency clauses using four market games, which 
differ with respect to the anti-trust legislation embodied. In the game STANDARD all 
cartelists are liable to penalty. In LENIENCY and BONUS, first whistle-blowers are 
granted immunity from fines, and in BONUS they may even collect bonuses. The 
conditions of LENIENCY resemble those applied in the OECD, and we consider BONUS 
because our theoretical analysis suggests that an anti-trust authority might prefer the 
outcome. In IDEAL, finally, cartel formation is outright impossible, a condition which 
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would seem bliss from the viewpoint of the anti-trust authority, and which thus 
provides a yard-stick for measuring the success of the other anti-trust legislations. 
Our game theoretic analysis suggests that STANDARD may induce cartel 
formation that sustains maximum prices at equilibrium. The same goes for LENIENCY, 
although the theoretical support appears less strong from an ex ante point of view. It 
takes BONUS to theoretically thwart cartels and induce competitive pricing. 
It is natural to wonder how these conclusions stand up empirically, which is 
where our experiment comes into the picture. In the lab, LENIENCY displays 
significantly lower prices than STANDARD which actually gives the highest market 
prices of all treatments. The lowest prices are found in IDEAL, and there is no 
significant difference between LENIENCY and IDEAL. LENIENCY furthermore gives the 
lowest percentage of cartel formation. 
Market prices in BONUS are above those of IDEAL and LENIENCY, and not 
statistically different to those observed in STANDARD. Moreover, the highest number 
of cartels are found in BONUS. Against the backdrop of our theoretical analysis the 
findings regarding BONUS appear quite surprising. Our theoretical analysis suggested 
that BONUS might have the most success in pre-empting cartels and inducing 
competitive pricing. That is clearly not the case.  
We limit attention to these four market games, which constitute modifications 
from a simple benchmark version of the one-shot Bertrand model. Treating a basic 
model seems to us a natural starting point for experiments on leniency clauses in anti-
trust, and it is our hope that future research may consider extensions to judge how 
"robust" our findings are. Important issues to consider include repetition, asymmetries 
between firms, cartel formation involving a subset of firms, random cartel detection, 
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and markets with heterogeneous goods.13 For the time being, our findings in this 
paper provide no reason for Gary Spratling and Mario Monti to feel disappointed with 
the leniency clauses that have recently been incorporated into the anti-trust legislation 
in most member states of the OECD.  
                                                 
13 We note two things, about the first and the last of these issues: (i) It is a non-trivial problem in 
experimental design how to operationalize leniency clauses with repeated price competition. For 
example, it is not obvious what fines should be imposed in round z if someone blows the whistle in 
round y after there was chatting in round x, say with x<y<z. (ii) In our view, relaxing the assumption of 
homogeneity of goods is the most promising issue. In our design, firms that do not choose the lowest 
price have zero revenue and may in effect costlessly blow the whistle on their competitors despite the 
absence of immunity clauses. With heterogeneous products, firms that do not choose the lowest price 
would have non-zero revenue and therefore whistle-blowing would not be gratis. 
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APPENDIX A: THE INSTRUCTIONS 
A.1 Instructions for STANDARD 
 
INTRODUCTION 
Welcome to this experiment which concerns decision making in a market. You will be matched in 
groups of three persons. You will not be told who the other two persons in your group are. Each group 
of three persons is independent from the others. 
We use Talers to reward you. Each Taler is worth 2 Euros. How many Talers you win depends 
on the decisions made by you and the two others in your group. At the end of the experiment, all your 
Talers will be converted to Euros and paid to you in cash. 
In addition, you will be paid a 1 Euro show up fee. 
 
INSTRUCTION 
In this market, you and the two others compete in prices. It is possible to form a cartel, that is, to have a 
meeting where you could discuss prices. In reality, cartels are often illegal and if someone reports a 
cartel to the government the cartel members may be penalized. In this experiment there is a similar 
opportunity to report a meeting. If you have a meeting, and if someone reports this, you may have to 
pay a fine. 
The experiment is composed of three phases. 
 
Phase 1: The meeting 
Each person in your group must decide whether he/she wants to have a meeting with the two others. If 
there is at least one person who does not want to have a meeting, then there will be no meeting, and 
Phase 2 will start. If all three persons decide that they want to have a meeting, then a chat will be 
started on your computer screens. You will then be able to chat with the other two persons in your 
group for 10 minutes. You may write whatever you want, except that you may not identify yourself by 
name or number or gender or appearance or in any other way.  (The experimenter will monitor the chat; 
violations will result in disqualification from all payments and further participation in the experiment.) 
After the chat has finished, Phase 2 will start. 
 
Phase 2: The prices 
Each person in your group must choose one of the following prices:  
 91, 92, 93, 94, 95, 96, 97, 98, 99, 100 
Those persons who choose the lowest price in their group are called low price sellers. The others are 
called high price sellers. The profit (in Talers) of a low price seller is the difference between his/her 
price and 90, divided by the number of low price sellers. The profit of a high price seller is zero. 
 
Phase 3: The reports 
In this phase you first get information about the price choices for all persons in your group, and your 
earnings in Phase 2. What comes next depends on whether or not you had a meeting in Phase 1, and if 
someone in your group reports this. If you did not have a meeting in Phase 1, then the experiment ends 
here. 
If you had a meeting in Phase 1, then each of you must decide whether or not to report this. If 
none of you chooses to report the meeting, then the experiment ends here. 
If you had a meeting in Phase 1, and if at least one of you report this, then certain fines will 
have to be paid. In order to explain how this is done, we must define what is meant by a persons 
revenue: The revenue of a low price seller is his price, divided by the number of low price sellers. The 
revenue of a high price seller is zero. Each person's fine will be determined as 10% of that person's 
revenue.  
 
Payment 
You will be paid as described above (market profit minus the fine) plus 4 Talers, if this sums to a 
positive number. In addition you will receive the show-up fee. If the market profit minus the fine plus 
the 4 Talers does not sum to positive number, you will receive only the show-up fee. 
 
Thank you for your participation! 
 25
A.2 Instructions for LENIENCY 
 
INTRODUCTION 
{Exact same text as in STANDARD} 
 
INSTRUCTION 
In this market, you and the two others compete in prices. It is possible to form a cartel, that is, to have a 
meeting where you could discuss prices. In reality, cartels are often illegal and if someone reports a 
cartel to the government the cartel members may be penalized. In this experiment there is a similar 
opportunity to report a meeting. If you have a meeting, and if someone reports this, you may have to 
pay a fine. 
The experiment is composed of three phases. 
 
Phase 1: The meeting 
Each person in your group must decide whether he/she wants to have a meeting with the two others. If 
there is at least one person who does not want to have a meeting, then there will be no meeting, and 
Phase 2 will start. If all three persons decide that they want to have a meeting, then a chat will be 
started on your computer screens. You will then be able to chat with the other two persons in your 
group for 10 minutes. You may write whatever you want, except that you may not identify yourself by 
name or number or gender or appearance or in any other way.  (The experimenter will monitor the chat; 
violations will result in disqualification from all payments and further participation in the experiment.) 
After the chat has finished, Phase 2 will start. 
 
Phase 2: The prices 
Each person in your group must choose one of the following prices:  
 91, 92, 93, 94, 95, 96, 97, 98, 99, 100 
Those persons who choose the lowest price in their group are called low price sellers. The others are 
called high price sellers. The profit (in Talers) of a low price seller is the difference between his/her 
price and 90, divided by the number of low price sellers. The profit of a high price seller is zero. 
 
Phase 3: The reports 
In this phase you first get information about the price choices for all persons in your group, and your 
earnings in Phase 2. What comes next depends on whether or not you had a meeting in Phase 1, and if 
someone in your group reports this. If you did not have a meeting in Phase 1, then the experiment ends 
here. 
If you had a meeting in Phase 1, then each of you must decide whether or not to report this. If 
none of you chooses to report the meeting, then the experiment ends here. 
If you had a meeting in Phase 1, and if at least one of you report this, then certain fines will 
have to be paid. In order to explain how this is done, we must define what is meant by a persons 
revenue: The revenue of a low price seller is his price, divided by the number of low price sellers. The 
revenue of a high price seller is zero. 
The following four cases explain how the fine is determined. 
If you report the meeting and neither of the other two reports the meeting, then you pay no fine. 
If you report the meeting and exactly one of the other two also reports the meeting, then your 
fine is 5% of your revenue. 
If you report the meeting and both the other two also report the meeting, then your fine is 6.67% 
of your revenue. 
If you do not report the meeting (but someone else does), then your fine is 10% of your revenue. 
 
Payment 
You will be paid as described above (market profit minus the fine) plus 4 Talers, if this sums to a 
positive number. In addition you will receive the show-up fee. If the market profit minus the fine plus 
the 4 Talers does not sum to positive number, you will receive only the show-up fee. 
 
Thank you for your participation! 
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A.3 Instructions for BONUS 
 
INTRODUCTION 
{Exact same text as in STANDARD} 
INSTRUCTION 
In this market, you and the two others compete in prices. It is possible to form a cartel, that is, to have a 
meeting where you could discuss prices. In reality, cartels are often illegal and if someone reports a 
cartel to the government the cartel members may be penalized. In this experiment there is a similar 
opportunity to report a meeting. If you have a meeting, and if someone reports this, you may have to 
pay a fine. It is also possible that you receive a bonus if you report the meeting.  
The experiment is composed of three phases. 
Phase 1: The meeting 
Each person in your group must decide whether he/she wants to have a meeting with the two others. If 
there is at least one person who does not want to have a meeting, then there will be no meeting, and 
Phase 2 will start. If all three persons decide that they want to have a meeting, then a chat will be 
started on your computer screens. You will then be able to chat with the other two persons in your 
group for 10 minutes. You may write whatever you want, except that you may not identify yourself by 
name or number or gender or appearance or in any other way.  (The experimenter will monitor the chat; 
violations will result in disqualification from all payments and further participation in the experiment.) 
After the chat has finished, Phase 2 will start. 
Phase 2: The prices 
Each person in your group must choose one of the following prices:  
 91, 92, 93, 94, 95, 96, 97, 98, 99, 100 
Those persons who choose the lowest price in their group are called low price sellers. The others are 
called high price sellers. The profit (in Talers) of a low price seller is the difference between his/her 
price and 90, divided by the number of low price sellers. The profit of a high price seller is zero. 
Phase 3: The reports 
In this phase you first get information about the price choices for all persons in your group, and your 
earnings in Phase 2. What comes next depends on whether or not you had a meeting in Phase 1, and if 
someone in your group reports this. If you did not have a meeting in Phase 1, then the experiment ends 
here. 
If you had a meeting in Phase 1, then each of you must decide whether or not to report this. If 
none of you chooses to report the meeting, then the experiment ends here. 
If you had a meeting in Phase 1, and if at least one of you report this, then certain fines will 
have to be paid, and certain bonuses paid out. In order to explain how this is done, we must define what 
is meant by a persons revenue: The revenue of a low price seller is his price, divided by the number of 
low price sellers. The revenue of a high price seller is zero. 
The following four cases explain how the fine and bonus is determined. 
If you report the meeting and neither of the other two reports the meeting, then you pay no fine. 
You receive a bonus equal to the fine paid by the other two. 
If you report the meeting and exactly one of the other two also reports the meeting, then your 
fine is 5% of your revenue. You receive a bonus equal to half of the fine paid by the person who 
did not report the meeting. 
If you report the meeting and both the other two also report the meeting, then your fine is 6.67% 
of your revenue. You receive no bonus. 
If you do not report the meeting (but someone else does), then your fine is 10% of your revenue. 
You receive no bonus. 
Payment 
You will be paid as described above (market profit minus the fine plus the bonus) plus 4 Talers, if this 
sums to a positive number. In addition you will receive the show-up fee. If the market profit minus the 
fine plus the bonus plus the 4 Talers does not sum to positive number, you will receive only the show-
up fee. 
Thank you for your participation! 
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A.4 Instructions for IDEAL 
 
INTRODUCTION 
{Exact same text as in STANDARD} 
 
INSTRUCTION 
In this market, you and the two others compete in prices. 
 
The prices 
Each person in your group must choose one of the following prices:  
 91, 92, 93, 94, 95, 96, 97, 98, 99, 100 
Those persons who choose the lowest price in their group are called low price sellers. The others are 
called high price sellers. The profit (in Talers) of a low price seller is the difference between his/her 
price and 90, divided by the number of low price sellers. The profit of a high price seller is zero. 
 
Payment 
You will be paid as described above (market profit) plus 4 Talers. In addition you will receive the 
show-up fee. 
 
Thank you for your participation! 
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APPENDIX B: THE QUESTIONNAIRE 
Below is the questionnaire for BONUS. The questionnaires for the other treatments include subsets of 
these questions, omitting those that were not relevant in the specific treatment. 
1) How many participants form a group?  
1  2  3  4 
2) How many participants in your group must indicate that they want to communicate with the 
others if a chat is to be started?  
0  1  2  3 
3) If your price is p and you are the only "low price seller" what are your profits?  
0  p   (p-90)  (p-90)/2 
4) and your revenues?  
0  p  p/2  (p-90)/2 
5) If your price is p and you are one of two "low price sellers" what are your profits?  
0  p/2  (p-90)  (p-90)/2   
6) and your revenues?  
0  p-45  p  p/2  
7) If your price is p and the price of the other two are also p what are your profits?  
0   p/3  (p-90)   (p-90)/3 
8) and your revenues?  
0  p  (p-90)/3  p/3 
9) If your price is p and you are a "high price seller" what are your profits?  
0   (p-90)  p  (p-90)/3 
10) and your revenues?  
0  p  p-90  p/3 
11) If you are a "high price seller" and you are imposed a fine of 10%, how much do you have to 
pay?  
0  10  (90-p)/10  p/10 
12) If there was a meeting in your group, and nobody reports it, is it then possible that some one 
in your group must pay a fine?  
Yes  No 
13) If there was a meeting in your group, and you are the only one reporting it, what are the fines 
to you?  
None  10% of your revenues 5% of your revenues 3.33% of your revenues 
14) and what bonus will you receive?  
None  10 the fine paid by the others  half of the fine paid by the participant in 
your group who did not report the meeting 
15) If there was a meeting in your group, and you and another participant report it, what are the 
fines to you?  
    None  10% of your revenues 5% of your revenues 3.33% of your revenues 
16) and what bonus will you receive?  
   None  10 the fine paid by the others  half of the fine paid by the participant in 
your group who did not report the meeting  
17) If there was a meeting in your group, and if all three report it, what are the fines to you?  
   None  10% of your revenues 5% of your revenues 3.33% of your revenues 
18) If there was a meeting in your group, and somebody else but not you reports it, what are the 
fines to you?  
   None  10% of your revenues 5% of your revenues 3.33% of your revenues 
19) and what bonus will you receive?  
   None  10 the fine paid by the others  half of the fine paid by the participant in  
your group who did not report the meeting 
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APPENDIX C: DATA 
 
 
Table 5: Individual prices, cartels, and individual reports 
 
        STANDARD LENIENCY BONUS IDEAL 
  Firm 1 Firm 2 Firm 3  Firm 1 Firm 2 Firm 3  Firm 1 Firm 2 Firm 3  Firm 1 Firm 2 Firm 3
Group 1  100 100 100   100*  96*  100*   93 95 95   94 93 92 
Group 2  100 100 100  95  91 95  92  92*  92*     92 94 97
Group 3  93 92 93   98*  95* 100  100 100 100     
   
96 99 94
Group 4  93 95 95 100 100  100*   96* 100  100*     
    
91 95 93
Group 5  93 91 92  91*  100*  97*  91      93 92 93 91 91
Group 6  98 100  100*  91 93 93  96  96*  96*     94 93 93
Group 7   100* 99  99*  96 92 91         
      
97 93 93 99 99 93
Group 8  91 93 91 92 94 94  100  100* 100     91 92 100
Group 9   100*  100* 98      91 91 92 100 100 100     94 96 99
Group 10  100 100 100  100 100 100   100* 100 100     92 100 95
Group 11  100 100 100  – – –   95*  100* 100     93 95 94
Group 12  97 98  100*      93 95 93 98  92*  96*     
             
                
     
100 100 91
Group 13  91 91 91
Group 14 92 93 95
Group 15 100 100 100         
     Group 16  99*  92*  100*         
 
Note: A bold price indicates that the firm wanted to communicate with the others. A shaded cell indicates that a cartel was formed in the 
corresponding group. The symbol * indicates that the firm reported the cartel. Group 11 in LENIENCY is excluded from the analysis of prices 
and reports because of a violation of the experimental procedures during the chat. 
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